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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARK KING, ) 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, ) 
vs. ] 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE ] 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,; 
SUPERIOR ROOFING COMPANY and/ ] 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND ] 
OF UTAH, ] 
Defendants and Respondents, ] 
) Case No. 920464 CA 
) Priority No. 7 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Section 35-1-86 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue on appeal herein is whether a Utah Workers 
Compensation Claimant is entitled to receive Workers Compensation 
Benefits during the time of his incarceration. An additional issue 
is whether the unavailability of surgical treatment at the Utah 
State Prison is sufficient justification for the insurer to refuse 
payment of benefits. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Petitioner believes the determinative provisions regarding 
the issues raised on appeal herein are: 
a. Section 35-1-45 Utah Code Annotated. 
b. Section 35-1-65 Utah Code Annotated. 
(See Addendum for text of Code Sections). 
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The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-
16(4)(b) and (d) authorize Appellate Court relief when an agency 
has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by statute or 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law. The standard of review 
with respect to questions of law the Appellate court does not defer 
to the Commission and applies a correction of error standard. 
Morton International v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 
(1991). The Appellate court need give no deference to the legal 
interpretation of Section 45 applied by the Industrial Commission. 
There has been no expressed or implied grant of power to construe 
said statute. Cross v. Board of Review of Industrial, 824 P.2d 
1202, 1204 (Ut. App. 1992). 
With regard to questions of fact, the Standard for Review is: 
fl[F]indings of fact will be affirmed if they are 'supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the whole record 
before the court'". Miriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 
(Ut App 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Workers Compensation Case involves a Petition for Review 
of an Industrial Commission Order affirming the Administrative Law 
Judge's denial of disputed benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
a. Petitioner suffered an on the job injury on or about 
November 20, 1989. (R. 3, 11). 
b. Petitioner sought and received Workers Compensation 
Benefits. (R. 3, 11). 
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c. The Petitioner was scheduled for wrist surgery on or 
about May 30, 1990. (R. 11). 
d. On May 22, 1990 the Applicant was arrested for a 
probation violation and ultimately sent to the Utah State Prison 
until October 13, 1990. (R. 11). 
e. The Applicant sought treatment for his industrial injury 
while in prison (R 102-103). (R. 102, 103). 
f. The surgery originally scheduled for May 30, 1990 did not 
take place until January 30, 1991. (R. 11). 
g. The employer refused to pay benefits for the period 
during which the Petitioner was incarcerated as well as the 
interlude before the surgery took place on January 30, 1991. (R. 
3, 11). 
h. The Administrative Law Judge refused to award benefits 
for said period. (R. 12, 13). 
i. The refusal of the Administrative Law Judge to award 
benefits was affirmed by the Industrial Commission on June 24, 
1992. (R. 57). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The injured worker is entitled to receive benefits for the 
period during which he was incarcerated. 
The injured worker should not be punished because of the 
unavailability of surgery while incarcerated. 
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION 
It should be noted that the authorities have, and this court 
should, differentiate between Temporary Total Disability Benefits, 
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Permanent Partial Disability Benefits, Medical Benefits and 
Permanent Total Disability Benefits with respect to the issue 
raised herein. The parties do not dispute that this claimant and 
this Appeal involve Temporary Total Disability Benefits only. 
ARGUMENT 
Argument I 
CLAIMANTS ARE ENTITLED TO BENEFITS 
WHILE INCARCERATED 
A review of the authorities which have dealt with the subject 
of Workers Compensation Benefits for incarcerated claimants shows 
that the vast majority of jurisdictions which have decided the 
issue have ruled in favor of the Claimant and/or the Claimant's 
dependents. It should be noted that other courts have, and this 
court should, analyze the issue of compensation for incarcerated 
claimants with respect to the varying types of benefits that are 
available pursuant to the Workers Compensation Act. This case 
specifically involves Temporary Total compensation benefits. See 
Section 65 of the Act in Addendum. Section 65 benefits can 
generically be referred to as those benefits which claimants 
receive while off work and prior to reaching a fixed state of 
recovery. Medical benefits are also payable under the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act, Section 45. Any decision rendered by this Court 
should consider specifically excluding medical benefits and 
Permanent or Total Disability Benefits. 
Professor Larsen treats the subject at Section 47.31(g) of his 
treatise, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 1954, Arthur Larsen, 
Matthew Bender and Company Inc. A review of Professor Larsen's 
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treatise shows that the states of New York, Michigan, Louisiana, 
Arizona, Ohio, and Florida have refused to terminate benefits to 
incarcerated claimants. The states of Virginia and North Dakota do 
allow for the suspension or termination of benefits while a 
claimant is incarcerated. It should be noted that the termination 
of benefits allowed by North Dakota is statutorily proscribed, 
however it should be noted that the North Dakota scheme provides 
that the benefits shall be payable to the family of the 
incarcerated claimant, if any. 
The legal conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Industrial Commission of Utah focus on the issue of causation. The 
legal conclusion of the Industrial Commission was that the Claimant 
was at fault, and that the period of disability was due to the 
fault of the Claimant in being sent to prison. 
In the case of Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 
(Utah App 1988) the Utah Court of Appeals stated that: "These 
factors [proximate cause, foreseeability, negligence, intervening 
causes] are not present in the statutory Workers1 Compensation 
System, which excludes considerations of fault" i.d. at 956. In 
Large the Utah Court of Appeals strongly expressed the position 
that the theories underlying tort liability are simply not 
applicable to Workers' Compensation Cases. 
The facts show that the injured worker went without necessary 
surgical treatment while he was incarcerated. The Commission and 
the Administrative Law Judge point the finger of fault at the 
injured worker and state unequivocally that the lack of treatment 
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was entirely the fault of the injured worker. Because Workers' 
Compensation is not a fault based system it is inappropriate for 
the Industrial Commission to attempt to assign fault to the injured 
worker. 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Statute, as noted by the 
Administrative Law Judge, does not specifically address the 
question of compensability during times of incarceration. Should 
benefits be awarded to an incarcerated Claimant who is eventually 
acquitted? Should an exception be made for benefits to an 
incarcerated Claimant who is incarcerated pending trial? Should an 
exception be made for an incarcerated Claimant who is subject to a 
parole or probation hold? 
The code provides simply that benefits shall be paid, without 
any exclusion for periods of incarceration. 
The implications of the ban on compensation for incarcerated 
claimants as proposed by the ALJ and the Industrial Commission 
should not be ignored. Numerous hypothetical examples come to mind 
which would work a hardship on claimants and be a misapplication of 
the law. For example, should an incarcerated claimant whose 
surgery is delayed due to his pretrial incarceration without bail 
be awarded benefits if said incarcerated claimant is eventually 
acquitted? 
Another example would be an incarcerated claimant whose 
conviction is overturned on appeal after a long jail stay which 
delayed surgery. 
The position taken by the Industrial Commission ignores the 
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many factual variations that arise regarding benefits for 
incarcerated Claimants. 
The key issue presented by this Appeal is the legal effect of 
an extended period of Temporary Total Disability. Although the 
fact that this Appellant's period or increased period of disability 
occurred in a prison setting, while subjecting the Claimant to 
penal sanctions, does not justify removing the Claimant from that 
general class of claimants whose period of disability was extended 
for any one of a number of possible reasons. Such reasons might 
include: 
1. A surgeon who is unavailable due to military service or 
disability; 
2. A claimant residing in a remote area whose period of 
disability is extended due to unavailability of treatment; 
3. A claimant whose period of disability is extended due to 
a non-industrial medical conditions, e.g. a back surgery that 
cannot be performed due to pulmonary disability. 
An additional factor to be discussed in more detail below, is 
the availability of medical benefits to incarcerated claimants. 
The Workers Compensation Act does not, on its face, empower 
the Industrial Commission to refuse to award benefits to 
incarcerated claimants. The Industrial Commission is a creation of 
the legislature of Utah and as such has no equitable power absent 
a specific delegation of such authority. Bevans v. Industrial 
Commission, 790 p.2D 573, 576 (Ut. App. 1990). 
An all or nothing rule regarding compensation for incarcerated 
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claimants would be inappropriate due to the fact that there are 
numerous factual variations to which any rule or rules must apply. 
POINT II 
THE INJURED WORKER SHOULD NOT BE PUNISHED 
DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT 
The record reflects at page 102, 103 that the Claimant 
reported his industrial related medical problems to the prison 
medical personnel in due course. The injured worker was not 
afforded the opportunity to receive a surgery while incarcerated. 
If this Court held as a matter of law that incarcerated 
Claimants were entitled, at least, to medical benefits while 
incarcerated it is conceivable that the funding level for inmates 
would rise. The Department of Corrections could seek reimbursement 
from various Workers Compensation insurance carriers for any 
treatment paid for by the taxpayer by passing the burden of medical 
treatment for industrial related conditions onto the industrial 
insurer. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Workers Compensation Act does not empower the 
Industrial Commission to withhold Workers Compensation Benefits 
from incarcerated Claimants. The Utah Workers Compensation Act is 
not a fault based system. While the Utah Courts have not 
specifically addressed this issue, the majority position is that 
benefits should not be terminated. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for the following relief: 
1. For an Order overturning the legal conclusion reached by 
the Industrial Commission and awarding benefits to Petitioner; 
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2. For a judicial determination that the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act does not provide for termination of Workers 
Compensation Benefits to incarcerated Claimants. 
3. For such other and further relief as may be just and 
proper under the circumstances. 
DATED this 2^ daY of October, 1992. 
JLc 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents 
to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee 
who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury oc-
curred, if the accident was not purposely self-in-
flicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medi-
cines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsi-
bility for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and fu-
neral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
the employee. 1988 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of 
payments — State average weekly 
wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive 662/3% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is ob-
tained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of 
recovery, and when no such light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, tempo-
rary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to 
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined 
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of 
each year, the total wages reported on contribution 
reports to the department of employment security un-
der the commission for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total in-
sured workers reported for the preceding year by 
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensa-
tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month Deriod commencing July 1 following the June 
